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less sensitive to the deterring effect of uncertain policy environments on investment. One implication of
our results is that research on international strategy should emphasize understanding the political
institutions that constrain or enable political actors, just as entry mode research has done. A second
implication is that research in the stages model of internationalization should give the same weight to the
policy environment as a source of uncertainty to a firm, as it has given to cultural, social and market
institutions.

Keywords
stages model, internationalization, political risk, organizational learning, Japan

Disciplines
Business Administration, Management, and Operations | International Business

This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/mgmt_papers/54

Political Hazards, Experience and Sequential Entry Strategies: The
International Expansion of Japanese Firms, 1980 -1998

ANDREW DELIOS
Department of Business Policy
National University of Singapore
1 Business Link, Singapore 117592
Tel: (65) 6874-3094
Fax: (65) 6779-5059
E-mail: andrew@nus.edu.sg

and
WITOLD J. HENISZ
Department of Management
The Wharton School
2021 Steinberg Hall-Dietrich Hall
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6370
Tel: (215) 898-0788
Fax: (215) 898-0401
E-mail: henisz@wharton.upenn.edu

September 12, 2002

* This research was supported by an RGC Grant (#HKUST6217/00H) and by a Social Sciences and
Humanities Research Council of Canada Grant (#410-2001-0143). We thank Lorraine Eden, Ram
Mudambi, Nicolaj Siggelkow and seminar participants at the Stern School of Business at New York
University for their insightful comments and Freek Vermeulen for providing data for cultural distance
measurements.

Political Hazards, Experience and Sequential Entry Strategies: The
International Expansion of Japanese Firms, 1980 -1998

ABSTRACT.
We find support for the role of experiential learning in the international expansion process by
extending the stages model of internationalization to incorporate a sophisticated consideration of
temporal and cross-national variation in the credibility of the policy environment. Using a sample of
3,857 international expansions of 665 Japanese manufacturing firms, we build on the concepts of
uncertainty and experiential learning, to show that firms that had gathered relevant types of
international experience were less sensitive to the deterring effect of uncertain policy environments on
investment. One implication of our results is that research on international strategy should emphasize
understanding the political institutions that constrain or enable political actors, just as entry mode
research has done. A second implication is that research in the stages model of internationalization
should give the same weight to the policy environment as a source of uncertainty to a firm, as it has
given to cultural, social and market institutions.
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An extensive literature on corporate expansions based in the stages model of internationalization
(Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; Luostarinen, 1980) examines how geographic distance and market,
linguistic and cultural differences influence a firm’s international expansion process across countries.
We seek to extend this literature on the stages model to incorporate insight into how the political
environment influences choices about which markets to enter for firms with different levels and types
of international investment experience. We make this extension because scholars emphasize that
political hazards are a primary determinant of the likelihood of entry (Kobrin et. al. 1980). The stages
model, however, has had a unitary focus in defining foreign market uncertainty as extending from
cultural differences (Barkema et al., 1996). The omission of political hazards in extant stages models
leaves these models incomplete and, as we find, could lead to poor empirical support for its main
conjectures. Including the political environment in the stages model does not require an alteration of
its core concepts – uncertainty and experiential learning – but it does require a multifaceted rather
than unitary conceptualization of a nation’s institutional environment.
In a stages model that omits consideration of the political environment, firms would be
expected to move across markets of similar culture with relative ease. For example, firms would be
expected to move sequentially from Singapore to Malaysia and Indonesia, from Chile to Peru and
Paraguay or from Hungary to the Czech and Slovak Republics. Many firms did follow such patterns,
but others held back noting that while similar in terms of markets and culture, these national markets
differed in their political environments.
The empirical specification we develop to test for such patterns in foreign entry sequences
extends the stages model while contributing to prior work on th e deterring effect of uncertainty in the
political environment (Delios & Henisz, 2000; Henisz & Delios, 2001) and the influence of
experience on patterns of internationalization (Erramilli, 1991; Barkema et al., 1996; Delios &
Beamish, 2001). We refine the concept of international experience to develop specific profiles of
experience that should be of particular importance to overcoming the uncer tainty that we model in our
empirical setting. This study thus provides a better understanding of the sources of uncertainty in
national institutional environments and identifies specific ways in which a firm sequences its
expansion to minimize the uncerta inty that it encounters in each FDI entry.
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BACKGROUND
International expansion in the stages model is a process rooted in uncertainty reduction through the
accumulation of relevant types of experience (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). Experience in a host
country, for example, provides important information about its business environment (Luostarinen,
1980) thereby reducing uncertainty, and enabling a firm to make a better evaluation of potential future
expansions (Barkema et al., 1996). Investment experience broadens a firm's perception of its
alternatives and increases the extent of its search (Cyert & March, 1963). The accumulation of
international investment experience is reflected in two sequences of foreign entry: one from culturally
and geographically close countries to more distant ones (Davidson, 1980), and one for a firm’s
investment path in a country, from exporting, to distribution, to joint venture manufacturing and
finally wholly-owned manufacturing (Davidson, 1980).
These two sequences stem from a reduction in knowledge and skill barriers to foreign
expansion that can accompany the accumulation of international experience (Henisz and Delios, 2001;
Delios & Beamish, 1999). Yet, within the aggregate measure of international experience, firms can
have diverse experience profiles that le ad to different levels of learning about national environments,
and hence different levels of uncertainty about those environments. Disaggregating experience into
fine-grained profiles may be necessary to identify its effects on a firm’s entry strategy. For example,
previous research demonstrates that experience gained in specific settings such as a subsidiary’s
industry, or the nation in which a subsidiary is sited, minimizes the deterring influence of political
hazards on entry modes (Delios & Henisz, 2000), and reduc es a firm’s tendency to follow the FDI
entry location and entry mode decisions of other firms (Henisz & Delios, 2001; Lu, 2001). National
experience, however, does not dimin ish the negative influence of political hazards on FDI entry rates
(Henisz & Delios, 2001). One question that motivates this paper is therefore “Are there specific types
of experience that can reduce the influence of political hazards on rates of FDI entry?”.
We introduce this question in the context of the stages model in which researchers have built
on the concept of absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990) to demonstrate expansion paths by
which firms acquire knowledge and develop skills applicable to new investment environments. Firms,
for example, tend to learn more effectively about new cultures from experience gathered in the host
3

country or related settings, than from experience gathered in distant cultural settings (Barkema et al.,
1996). Learning is also more effective when a firm follows a succession of incremental steps that
build its knowledge base, expand its absorptive capacity, and thereby enable learning in more
dissimilar environments (Barkema et al., 1997). Hence, experience is likely to provide the greatest
benefits to a firm engaged in international expansion when it is gained sequentially, in steps that
maximize opportunities to learn about specific dimensions of national environments, while
minimizing the extent of uncertainty a firm encounters in its international expa nsions.
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
The stages model is an intuitively appealing model that has received strong support in qualitative
work looking at the decisions made in the early stages of a firm’s expansion (Sullivan &
Bauerschmidt, 1990). Quantitative empirical work has, however, been less supportive (Turnbull,
1987). We suggest this weakness in the model comes from its relatively narrow conception of
international differences as stemming from cultural and market differences. The stages model focus
on culture and markets does not emerge as a weakness when the choice set of countries for expansion
is constrained to geographically nearby countries in which the structures of policymaking institutions
are similar as was the case for the European expansions undertaken by Northern European firms
captured by early research on the stages model (Nordström, 1991). When most countries in the world
and the concomitant wide variance in national institutional environments are considered, however, the
model has its greatest difficulty in explaining cross-country expansion sequences, perhaps again
because of the omission of measures of the political environment.
Political Hazards, Experience and Across-Country Expansion
The ability of a government to credibly commit to a giv en set of policies is of substantial
interest to a firm's international expansion strategy (Kobrin et al., 1980). Where policy credibility is
low, firms minimize commitments to a market, or avoid investment (Henisz & Delios, 2001).
Uncertainty from the public policy environment magnifies difficulties in collecting, interpreting and
organizing the information necessary for a successful entry by foreign direct investment (FDI),
increasing the relative costs of FDI, and increasing hurdle rates of return. When policymakers can act
unilaterally or have high certainty that a subservient or allied legislature and judicial branch will
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support their actions, future policies are likely to be particularly volatile in response to exogenous
shocks, to changes in the identity of policymakers or to changes in the preferences of existing
policymakers. Changes that are the result of direct lobbying by host country competitors or
incumbents are of particular concern to a firm making an international expansion. We refer to
countries characterized by such policymaking structures as politically hazardous.
Although the assertion that firms will eschew politically hazardous markets is not
controversial, a stages model perspective would suggest that a firm’s sensitivity to political hazards
would vary in its profile of prior experience, particularly where that experience profile assists a firm
in minimizing the operational impact of political hazards. One such important capability is that to
detect and safeguard against opportunistic behavior on the part of a host country government or by
partners, buyers, suppliers and competitors that may seek to influence a host country government
(Henisz & Williamson, 1999; Henisz 2000a). Such learning can be applied to develop strategies that
mitigate future public and private expropriation hazards (Delios & Henisz, 2000).
As with learning about culture (Barkema et al., 1996), experience is likely to have its most
profound effect on uncertainty reduction, when it is gained in a setting similar to the one in which a
FDI entry is being contemplated. Consequently, we expect that a firm with greater levels of
experience in environments characterized by a high level of political hazards will have developed
more appropriate experience and learning for dealing with uncertainty endemic to other politically
hazardous countries and therefore display less sensitivity to a country’s level of political hazards.
Hypothesis 1: A firm's stock of experience in politically hazardous countries moderates the
negative effect of a country’s level of political hazards on rates of FDI entry into that country.
A firm’s ability to overcome uncertainty in politically hazardous environments also depends
on its ability to focus attention on the resulting managerial challenges relative to other sources of
difficulty such as those associated with market or cultural uncertainty. Learning about international
operations is an inherently incremental process, which can be most effective when it occurs in a series
of sequential steps (Barkema et al., 1996). Consequently firms are likely to follow sequential
expansion paths that minimize the requisite amount of new knowledge and learning. If uncertainty
about a culture and the policy environment are both high, a substantial amount of learning is required,
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and the difficulties found in mounting a successful investment are magnified. FDI entry is thus less
likely. Once learning has occurred over one dimension of this uncertainty, such as cultur e, uncertainty
in the other, is less likely to deter FDI entry. This idea is similar to a double -layered acculturation
process in which differences in national and corporate cultures impose a barrier to learning in, and the
success of, foreign expansions (Barkema et al., 1996). Accordingly, we expect that when a firm has
experience with a given culture, it will be better prepared to enter a country in the same cultural block
with high policy uncertainty, and hence display less sensitivity to political hazards when
contemplating entering by a foreign subsidiary.
Hypothesis 2: A firm's stock of experience in countries within the same cultural block
moderates the negative effect of a country’s level of political hazards on rates of FDI entry
into that country.
We next consider the efficacy of accumulated experience across types of FDI entry. The
stages model identifies a distribution subsidiary as being a suitable mode for learning about local
customers and local culture. The suitability extends from the close contact a distribution facility
engenders betw een a firm and its consumers. Close contact is essential to acquiring experiential
knowledge about "…cultural patterns, structure of the market system, and more importantly,
characteristics of individual customer firms…" (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977: 28). The close contacts are
gained through a marketing interface, which creates linkages between a firm and its customers.
Although the decision to enter by either a manufacturing or a distribution subsidiary involves the
deliberation of a firm’s senior management, distribution subsidiaries have a lower commitment of
financial and human resources (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). Further, senior managers associated with
marketing and logistics functions are the ones most likely to be assigned to a distribution subsidiary.
The minimal commitment of senior management in a distribution subsidiary may impose
limitations to learning about political hazards. A distribution subsidiary is oriented and structured to
acquire information about markets and culture in a host country (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). As a low
commitment mode of entry, it is not likely that a firm making a distribution entry will be heavily
involved in negotiations and bargaining with a host country government. This contrasts to the case of
entry by a manufactur ing facility which likely involves extensive negotiations along a number of
dimensions. Engaging in communications with local authorities for the negotiation of land for a plant,
6

contracting for employees, arranging the regulatory or tax concessions for an investment, or securing
necessary licenses and permits for international trade and the repatriation of dividends, can help a
firm’s managers gain an understanding of the political process in a nation (Hillman et al., 1999). As
the political process in most countries is highly complex in which the outcomes of political behavior
are difficult to evaluate (Boddewyn, 1988), unless linkages are created to insiders in the political
process, it is difficult for a firm to understand the rules in a political system, and the dynamics
involved in the current issues (Hillman et al., 1999). The cross-functional expertise that accompanies
a manufacturing entry, as well as its comparatively greater extent of association and communication
with local authorities, relative to a distribution entry, makes it more likely to yield insight into these
political processes. Such features likely make the accrual of political hazard mitigation capabilities
greater for manufacturing experience than for distribution experience.
Hypothesis 3: A firm’s stock of experience in the operation of overseas manufacturing plants
moderates the negative effect of a country’s level of political hazards on rates of FDI entry
into that country.
METHODS
Setting, Data Sources and Sample
We test these hypotheses using panel data on the international expansion of Japanese firms.
Japanese firms are a suitable empirical context because they have been a leading investor worldwide
in the 1980s and 1990s (UNCTAD, 2001). By 1999, more than 100 countries had received Japanese
FDI, with 54 countries possessing at least 30 Japanese FDIs. This provides the country-level variance
required to test the effects of political hazards, while controlling for other economic influences.
We derived our sample from the 1,898 manufacturing firms listed on the first and second
sections of the Tokyo Stock Exchange as of 1997. We matched this list of firms with the foreign
subsidiary data found in the 1986, 1989, 1992, 1994, 1997 and 1999 editions of Toyo Keizai's annual
compendium of foreign investment, Japanese Overseas Investment. An edition reputedly contains a
complete listing of the stock of each firm's foreign subsidiaries in the year in which it was published
(Yamawaki, 1991; Henisz and Delios, 2001). This process yielded 5,894 instances in which a firm
had made at least one foreign investment in a host country of which only 94 were lost to casewise
deletion due to missing data on political hazards (Henisz, 2000b) or various economic and
demographic indicators (World Bank). For the final sample, we needed to be concerned with host
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country-firm pairs in which there was left censoring in the subsidiary foundation history. As few
Japanese subsidiaries tend to be divested in the first few years of operations (Delios & Beamish,
2001), we set initial subsidiary entry not prior to 1980 as our starting date and removed all host
country-firm pairs in which a firm made an FDI entry prior to 1980. After this, we had 3,857 cases in
which a Japanese firm had made at least one FDI in a host country.
Measures
Our dependent variable was an indicator variable, Exit, that took a value of 1 if firm x made an
entry in country i at time t, otherwise it was zero. Observations started in 1980, continued until an
entry occurred, or were right-censored in 1999, if Ex i t was zero in every year t for firm x in country i.
An entry was a foreign direct investment, not a portfolio investment, that resulted in a firm’s first
establishment of a foreign subsidiary in the focal host country.
Political hazards. We take this annual time-varying measure from Henisz (2000b). It
quantifies the extent to which any one institutional actor—e.g., the executive or a legislative
chamber—in a given country is unconstrained in its choice of policies in a given year. The measure is
constructed using a spatial model of political interaction that incorporates data on the number of
independent veto players and their party affiliations . The main results of the derivation are that (1)
each additional veto player (a branch of government that is both constitutionally effective and
controlled by a party different from other branches) provides a negative but diminishing effect on the
total level of hazards, and (2) hazards decline in the homogeneity (heterogeneity) of party preferences
within an opposed (aligned) veto player .
Cultural block distance. Following Barkema et al. (1996), we coded countries into Ronen and
Shenkar's (1985) cultural blocks, then made an ordinal ranking of these blocks in terms of their
comparative distance from Japan. The nearest cultural block to Japan was scored one, the next most
proximate two, and so forth. Results were similar if we used a cultural distance measure.
Investment experience. Using all data we compiled on the history of a firm’s investment
activity in all years, we computed several experience measures. We first calculated an International
experience measure that comprised a firm’s experience gathered in all national settings and by all
types of entry. We then decomposed international experience into various constituent types of
8

experience. We calculated the logarithm of a firm’s years of experience in the operation of
subsidiaries in countries with above (below) mean levels of political hazards (High (low) hazard
country experience); in countries in the same (another) cultural block ((Other) Cultural block
experience); and in manufacturing (distribution) entries (Manufacturing (distribution) experience).
Interactions. To test the hypotheses we developed six interaction terms. Each interaction w as
the multiplicative sum of the mean-centered value for a category of political hazards and experience.
For example, we computed the manufacturing experience*political hazards interaction for firm x in
country i at time t by multiplying the mean-centered value of manufacturing experience in firm x in
year t-1 by the mean-centered value of political hazards of country i in year t-1.
Firm -level controls. We included positive correlates of FDI activity: firm size (Employment),
technological assets (R&D intensity), marketing assets (Advertising intensity), and export activity
(Export intensity) (Caves, 1996). We included Country spread, a time-varying covariate of the
number of countries in which a firm had foreign investments, to control for the competing hypothesis
that FDI entry in a politically hazardous country is more likely by firms with diverse international
production capabilities because these firms have a valid option to leave (Fagre & Wells, 1982).
Country controls. We had two measures of market size, GDP per capita and Population, and
two of market potential, annual Population growth rate and annual GDP per capita growth rate
(Caves, 1996). We measured a country's relative attractiveness for foreign trade (Trade, annual value
of exports and imports over GDP) and for foreign investment (FDI, annual flow of FDI over GDP).
Fixed effects. We included annual, country and industry indicator variables . We could not
include firm indicator variables as this would expand the number of cells of data to about 500 million
thus exceeding the memory capacity needed for model estimation. Results were robust to a model
with firm indicator variables for a sub-sample of the 127 firms that had entered 10 or more countries.
Model
We estimated FDI entry rates using event history analysis, which uses a longitudinal record of
events in a sample from a population to examine the influences that a set of covariates have on the
event being examined. Our focal event is a firm’s first foreign subsidiary establishment in a host
country. In the analysis, firm x is considered to be at risk of entering country i in each time period t, or
9

until an FDI entry occurs. We used an exponential model in which there is no age parametric
dependence specified in the functional form of the model. This tec hnique models the rate of a
transition from an origin state (e.g., no FDI entry) to a destination state (e.g., FDI entry) as a function
of the covariates. Its general form is:
rjk = exp (α jk0 + Ajk1α jk 1 + Ajk 2α jk2…)
where rjk is the transition rate from th e origin state j to the destination state k, with the observed
covariate vector Ajk , parameters to be estimated α jk , and constant α jk 0. The estimation uses the
maximum likelihood method (Blossfeld & Rohwer, 1995). In our specification, significant positive
coefficient estimates indicate FDI entry rates increase when the covariate increases in value.
To estimate this model, we took the base sample of 3,857 first entries by a firm in a country
and expanded it into multiple spells that included all firm-country-year combinations among the 665
firms, 68 countries and the annual time periods in which an investment could be made. In each spell, a
firm was at risk of entering a country and was treated as right censored unless an FDI entry occurred.
Once we divided the data into annual spells and removed combinations in which a nation or firm did
not exist (e.g., pre-1986 observations for a firm founded in 1986), we had 816,908 observations.
RESULTS
Table 1 reports the FDI entry rate models. Model 1 presents the bas eline estimation which includes
annual, country and industry indicator variables , country and firm-level controls and cultural distance.
Model 2 adds political hazards as a main effect and interacted with international experience. Models 3
to 8 test hypotheses 1, 2 and 3. As multicollinearity could confound coefficient estimates for the
experience measures and the ir interactions with political hazards, we follow an established procedure
of testing each hypothesis in a separate model (Haunschild & Miner, 1997). Stable coefficient
estimates across specifications and likelihood tests, in which we compare a model to its baseline,
establish that the experience terms and interactions add new information to the model.
In the models, the hypotheses received strong statistical support and, more importantly given
the very large sample size, the substantive or economic significance of the coefficient estimates was
also quite strong (McCloskely & Ziliak, 1996). Model 1 presents a baseline specification which
includes cultural block distance as the measure of uncertainty stemming from national differences.
10

Contrary to conventional stages models predictions (Barkema et al., 1996; Johanson & Vahlne, 1977),
FDI entry rates were not related to a nation’s cultural block distance from Japan. When a cultural
block distance*international experience interaction was added to model 1, its coefficient estimate w as
negative, indicating FDI entry rates in culturally close countries became greater with greater levels of
international experience. These results hold when we define the sample as countries with below mean
levels of political hazards, thus confining uncertainty to the cultural level. Independent of the
consideration of political hazards, this result would suggest that Japanese firms’ sequence of country
choice for international expansion did not follow the stages model. The insignificance of the
international experience*political hazards interaction in model 2 supports our conjecture that
international experience is too aggregate a measure to inform about the mechanisms by which it
changes FDI entry rates.
For the results of the hypothesis tests, we confine our discussion to the economic significance
of our results. Hypothesis 1 predicted that a firm's experience in high hazard countries would
moderate the negative effect of political hazards on FDI entry rates. Consistent with that hypothesis,
firms with high experience in hazardous countries (one standard deviation above the mean level of
experience – 36 years) had a predicted probability of enter ing another hazardous country 58.5 percent
greater than a firm with no experience in hazardous countries. Similar increases in the probability of
entry were observed for countries at the mean level or with low levels of political hazards. This
relationship differs substantively from the effect of firm-level experience in low hazards countries, in
which the effect on FDI entry rates into low hazards countries was nearly three times larger than in
politically hazardous countries (a change of 147.5 versus 59.2 percent).
Hypothesis 2 predicted that experience in a cultural block would moderate the deterring effect
of political hazards on entries in that block. Moving from a cultural block experience level of zero, to
a high experience leve l (one standard deviation above the mean – 8 years) increased the predicted
probability of FDI entry by 14.1 percent in a low hazards setting, which was less than the 19.0 percent
increase in a high hazards setting. Meanwhile, experience in other cultural blocks did not moderate
the influence of political hazards. At all levels of experience in other cultural blocks, FDI entry rates
in low hazards countries were 18.9 percent greater than those in high hazard countries.
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Hypothesis 3 predicted a moderating role for manufacturing experience on the negative
relationship between political hazards and FDI entry. Manufacturing experience contributes positively
to FDI entry probabilities in high hazards settings . A firm with a high level (55 years) of
manufacturing experience had a 75.8 percent increase in the predicted probability of FDI entry when
political hazards were high, compared to a 29.9 percent increase when political hazards were low.
Meanwhile, the accumulation of distribution experience resulted in a 41.0 percent increase in the
predicted probability of FDI entry into low hazard countries, but a 12.0 percent decrease where
political hazards were high. We examined this result further by splitting the sample into two subsamples: first entries made by a distribution facility and first entries made by a manufacturing plant.
The results show that manufacturing experience provides a similar positive moderation of political
hazards for both distribution and manufacturing entries, with the negative moderating influence of
distribution experience confined to manufacturing entries.
DISCUSSION
We have considered the effect of international experience of various types on the process of
international expansion in a stages model we extended to include consideration of cross-national and
temporal variation in the credibility of the policy environment. We find that firms that have followed
a sequential process of international expansion exhibit a lower sensitivity to the deterring effect of
political hazards. The results provide substantial corroborating evidence for the underlying theoretical
premise of the stages model regarding the impact of uncertainty and accumulated experience on a
firm’s ability to overcome national differences in institutional environments. Importantly, however,
this corroborating evidence comes about when uncertainty emanating from the policy environment is
modeled as part of national institutional variations. When we only considered the cultural
environment, as in our model 1, Japanese firms seem to make investment decisions irrespective of the
level of uncertainty in the host environment. This result for uncertainty stemming from the cultural
environment, which contradicts conventional stages models predictions, might extend from an
absence of clos e cultural counterparts to Japan (Ronen & Shenkar, 1985), where the contrast between
close cultural counterparts and remote cultural countries provides a strong influence on foreign
expansion patterns and outcomes (Barkema, et al 1996).
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When we included the polic y environment – specifically, a measure of the feasibility of
policy change based upon the structure of political institutions; however, we found a robust
relationship between the extent of policy uncertainty and FDI entry rates. We found evidence that a
firm tried to minimize the amount of new information, and uncertainty, with which it must contend,
by expanding into settings in which it is familiar with at least one dimension (political or cultural) of
the institutional environment. Similarly, a firm tries to accumulate experience in developing
relationships between senior management and host country actors as occurs via direct investment in
manufacturing operations, as made prior to entering hazardous countries. By contrast, the market and
cultural based experience provided by a distribution facility is of the greatest assistance when entering
low hazard environments.
This study also advances research on experience effects in internationalization (Erramilli,
1991) by moving beyond aggregate measures of experience, which may proxy for unobserved
differences in a firm’s managerial competence, rather than the type of knowledge and skills
acquisition necessary for a firm to expand in a sequential process. By showing that firms with greater
levels of specific types of experience have higher rates of FDI entry into those countries where this
experience is of particular value, our study reinforces the importance of measuring and testing
experience effects in a way that aligns with the uncertainty that is to be overcome and the precise
capabilities a firm needs to develop.
Limitations and Future Directions
Although this study was rich in its number s of host countries and firms and in the time period
examined, it was limited to FDI entries by Japanese firms. The focus on Japanese firms creates a case
in which there were not any countries in the same cultural block in Japan (Ronen & Shenkar, 1985),
thereby deemphasizing the influence of the cultural dimension, while creating a greater emphasis on
the policy environment. In this sense, the sample presents a strong case for testing the influence of the
political dimension over the cultural dimension of national institutional environments. Another
limitation is our simplification of multinational entry strategies to the decision to enter in isolation
from other simultaneous decisions such as entry mode. Future work could refine both measures of the
national institutional environment to encompass legal, political and electoral rules as well as our
13

measures of international experience so as to draw a tighter association between experience and
learning. Refined measures and additional qualitative evidence could also show what specific
techniques and strategies firms employ to overcome uncertainty in the policy environment. One step
to reinforce the predictive validity of our measures is to examine the performance implications of
decisions made by firms with differing experience levels (Barkema et al., 1996). Examining
performance would help establish if the investment sequences we have identified increase the chances
of making a successful FDI entry.
Conclusion
This study extended ideas based in a stages model of international expansion to incorporate a
sophisticated perspective on the impact of uncertainty in a country’s policy environment on a firm’s
expansion strategy. We highlight that specific types of experience plausibly generate the capabilities
required for political hazard mitigation, which in turn influence the sensitivity of a firm’s rates of FDI
entry to polic y uncertainty. The implication from a theoretical perspective is that the policy
environment injects uncertainty into foreign markets independent of market and cultural
environments, and this policy uncertainty should be considered in theoretical treatments and practical
applications of sequential entry models. These theoretical arguments and the empirical evidence in
support thereof bring the stages model of internationalization in closer concordance with the large
body of empirical research emphasizing th e importance of political change and political processes for
international expansion strategies across time.
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TABLE 1
Exponential Estimation of Rates of FDI Entry Across Countries a,b
Variables
FDI
Trade
Population c
Population growth
GDP per capita

c

Cultural block distance
GDP per capita growth
R&D intensity
Advertising intensity
Export intensity
Employment c
Country spread
International experience c

Model 1
-3.429**
(1.108)
0.414**
(0.130)
2.175***
(0.360)
-27.507***
(5.911)
-0.042**
(0.015)
0.133
(0.517)
-1.462**
(0.463)
7.204***
(0.866)
3.352***
(0.970)
1.152***
(0.111)
0.535***
(0.020)
0.011**
(0.004)
0.172***
(0.016)

Political hazards
International experience c x
Political hazards
High hazard country
experience c
Low hazard country
experience c
High hazard country
experience c x Political hazards
Low hazard country
experience c x Political hazards
Cultural block experience c

Model 2
-3.436**
(1.108)
0.386**
(0.131)
2.207***
(0.360)
-29.357***
(6.048)
-0.043**
(0.015)
0.119
(0.517)
-1.569***
(0.469)
7.214***
(0.866)
3.355***
(0.970)
1.152***
(0.111)
0.535***
(0.020)
0.011**
(0.004)
0.178***
(0.020)
-0.187*
(0.090)
-0.014
(0.026)

Model 3
-3.391**
(1.108)
0.381**
(0.131)
2.207***
(0.361)
-29.100***
(6.047)
-0.043***
(0.015)
0.118
(0.517)
-1.602***
(0.469)
6.942***
(0.868)
3.126**
(0.973)
1.107***
(0.112)
0.537***
(0.020)
0.016***
(0.005)

Model 4
-3.343**
(1.110)
0.375**
(0.131)
2.211***
(0.360)
-29.171***
(6.046)
-0.042**
(0.015)
0.115
(0.517)
-1.550***
(0.469)
6.967***
(0.868)
3.099**
(0.973)
1.112***
(0.112)
0.536***
(0.020)
0.017***
(0.005)

Model 5
-3.613**
(1.103)
0.377**
(0.131)
2.160***
(0.362)
-29.411***
(6.040)
-0.040**
(0.015)
0.121
(0.519)
-1.356**
(0.465)
7.005***
(0.870)
2.972**
(0.960)
1.287***
(0.109)
0.563***
(0.020)
0.030***
(0.004)

Model 6
-3.633**
(1.104)
0.376**
(0.131)
2.151***
(0.363)
-29.399***
(6.040)
-0.040**
(0.015)
0.128
(0.519)
-1.353**
(0.465)
7.022***
(0.871)
2.978**
(0.960)
1.292***
(0.110)
0.561***
(0.020)
0.030***
(0.004)

Model 7
-3.618**
(1.102)
0.397**
(0.131)
2.229***
(0.361)
-29.331***
(6.043)
-0.043**
(0.015)
0.118
(0.518)
-1.412**
(0.465)
7.496***
(0.868)
3.092**
(0.962)
1.270***
(0.111)
0.543***
(0.020)
0.016***
(0.005)

Model 8
-3.660***
(1.103)
0.390**
(0.131)
2.232***
(0.361)
-29.342***
(6.043)
-0.042**
(0.015)
0.117
(0.517)
-1.410**
(0.465)
7.543***
(0.868)
3.108**
(0.961)
1.271***
(0.111)
0.544***
(0.020)
0.014***
(0.005)

-0.172*
(0.087)

-0.242*
(0.095)

-0.185*
(0.086)

-0.239*
(0.092)

-0.178*
(0.086)

-0.200*
(0.089)

0.147***
(0.018)
0.199***
(0.018)

0.149***
(0.018)
0.183***
(0.018)
0.018*
(0.009)
-0.141***
(0.040)
0.084***
(0.014)
-0.011
(0.012)

0.086***
(0.014)
-0.010
(0.012)
0.036*
(0.017)
0.007
(0.033)
0.098***
(0.013)
0.051***
(0.013)

0.119***
(0.014)
0.035*
(0.014)
0.141***
(0.030)
-0.159***
(0.027)

-20,478
12,266***
76***
816,908
3,857

-21,458
12,306***
40***
816,908
3,857

Other cultural blocks
experience c
Cultural block experience c x
Political hazards
Other cultural blocks
experience c x Political hazards
Manufacturing experience c
Distribution experience c
Manufacturing experience c x
Political hazards
Distribution experience c x
Political hazards
Model Indices
Log likelihood
Chi-square
Change in chi-square
Number of episodes
Number of entries

Notes :

-20,450
12,320***
-816,908
3,857

-20,447
10,326***
6***
816,908
3,857

-20,444
12,334***
144***
816,908
3,857

-20,435
12,352***
18***
816,908
3,857

-20,492
12,238***
48***
816,908
3,857

-20,489
12,244***
6***
816,908
3,857

a

*** p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05
Nation, industry and annual fixed effects i ncluded in all models, but not reported.
c
Variable is a logarithm.
b
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